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The Roberts Court &
The Business Cases
Kenneth W. Starr*
This is the Court, it is said, that Wall Street has fallen madly in love
with.' It is an absolute bull market at the Supreme Court. In fact, as the
Court rose for the summer recess, one leading member of the United States
Chamber of Congress Litigation Division was heard uncorking the
champagne and quoting, from the perspective of the American business
community: "It's our best Supreme Court term ever .... ,2 As usual, one
journey is beneath the surface, and that is the course we will travel today. I
see a less monolithic pattern-certainly a richer mosaic-in these business-
related cases than the above quote implies.
It is my suggestion that this is a Court that is not so much pro-business
as it is massively skeptical of civil litigation, especially nationwide civil
litigation. Much of this civil litigation is seen by the Justices as challenging
and clogging the judicial system, and as creating what are seen as enormous
. Duane and Kelly Roberts Dean and Professor of Law, Pepperdine University.
1. See Ben Winograd & Jess Bravin, Justices Get Down to Business, WALL ST. J., June 26,
2006, at A2; see also Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2007, at C 1.
2. Greenhouse, supra note 1, at C1. The Supreme Court's October 2006 Term did demonstrate
a business-friendly approach. For example, in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the Court dismissed
an $80 million punitive damage verdict, ruling that juries cannot use a single victim's suit to punish
a company for harm done by its products to thousands of others. Philip Morris USA v. Williams,
127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). In Credit Suisse Securities (USA), L.L.C. v. Billing, the Court held that
antitrust laws do not apply to the syndication and marketing techniques used in initial public
offerings. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007). The Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. decision makes it easier for corporate defendants to seek and win
dismissal of lawsuits filed by investors alleging securities fraud or market manipulation. Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007). Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. established that employment discrimination suits must be filed within the 180 day deadline set
by Congress; otherwise they are time-barred, which means that new paychecks do not constitute new
instances of pay discrimination. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
Another business-friendly victory was Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr, in which the Court
held that companies do not have to notify consumers that they are using the consumer's credit
ratings to influence rates. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007).
pressures (especially with publicly held companies) to settle the cases. 3 This
skepticism cuts across the usual ideological lines on the Court, as I hope to
demonstrate very briefly.
It appears that the Court, in terms of commercially significant cases, is
showing at least that it is trying to be sensitive to an overarching problem of
arbitrariness and caprice that is the civil justice system.4
The courts continue to focus on punitive damages. To many this is
deeply unsatisfying jurisprudentially and reflects quite openly the age-old
judicial concern with the arbitrary deprivation of property and liberty. It is
especially unsatisfying when the democratic process-through legislation-
results in what is seen as more calibrated, more measured punishments, with
one of the baselines being treble damages in the antitrust laws.6
The Court's focus in this area is an echo of Justice Breyer's book, Active
Liberty-it is better for the people to participate through the representative
process than for judicial power to be exercised.7 The concern, in short, is
the confluence of very large class actions, which raise what are seen as Due
Process concerns. These cases have been addressed by the Court in the
years before Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito took the bench.8 These
are constitutional concerns, but they are also basic equity issues.
Consider who profits at the end of a litigation day. Is it the clients who
are prospering, or is it the legal class that is prospering? Consider also the
concerns about the loosely regulated and relatively cumbersome civil justice
system at the pretrial phase, and the concerns and even skepticism about the
capacity of that system to bring about efficient and fair results. There is, in
short, too much time, expense, and discovery if the system is unregulated,
and too much pressure to settle.
Now, if this sounds like law and economics from a "conservative
perspective," fasten your seat belts, because you will soon hear some
dramatic readings-brief ones-from Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. I could
also read from Justice Souter, but time does not permit.
3. See supra note 2.
4. See supra note 2.
5. See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1057.
6. See id. at 1065 (dismissing an $80 million punitive damages verdict); Credit Suisse, 127 S.
Ct. at 2397 (ruling that the Securities and Exchange Commission is in a better position to evaluate
the propriety of an IPO offeror's behavior, thus preventing an award of treble damages); Tellabs,
127 S. Ct. at 2503 (raising the threshold of a plaintiffs pleadings to overcome dismissal in securities
fraud cases).
7. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5
(2005).
8. See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1059-60; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 417-18 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
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This perspective cuts across the usual ideological divides, as I said
before. But it does not seem to me that law and economics are really driving
the agenda. Rather, it is skepticism and concern about fundamental fairness
in the civil justice system, as well as a deepening sense that it is not
appropriate for the judiciary to construct new causes of action or to improve
upon causes of action created by Congress.9 It is, in this sense, a restrained
Court cutting across ideological lines. We saw this in the case that we will
talk about later, Credit Suisse v. Billing, which has been described as
perhaps the most important securities law case in the last thirty years. 1O
No one can be in favor of fraud, but let me quote Justice Ginsburg. She
said, "Private securities fraud actions.., if not adequately contained, can be
employed abusively to impose substantial costs on companies and
individuals whose conduct conforms to the law.""
Consider Justice Breyer in Credit Suisse.12  The question before the
Court was whether an antitrust action may be brought when the allegation is
that a number of investment banking firms formed syndicates in connection
with technology initial public offerings? 3 We remember those technology
IPOs that enjoyed great success and then typically crashed and burned. A
nationwide class action was brought by very able lawyers, and the Supreme
Court of the United States would have none of it. 14
Consider these words of Justice Breyer: "[A]ntitrust plaintiffs may bring
lawsuits throughout the nation in dozens of different courts with different
nonexpert judges and different nonexpert juries."' 5  Do you see the
"nonexpert"? He had previously talked about the expertise of a designated
agency created by Congress-the SEC. 16 According to Justice Breyer and a
majority of the Court, we need to centralize evaluation in an expert agency
and ask what the investment bankers did when they did it: 17
In light of the nuanced nature of the evidentiary evaluations
necessary to separate the permissible from the impermissible, it will
9. See Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2383.
10. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Back Underwriters on New Issues, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2007, at C 1.
11. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2504.
12. Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2383.
13. Id. at 2387.
14. Id. at 2383.
15. Id. at 2395.
16. Id. at 2394-95.
17. Id.
prove difficult for those many different courts to reach consistent
results. And, given the fact-related nature of many such
evaluations, it will also prove difficult to assure that the different
courts evaluate similar fact patterns consistently. The result is an
unusually high risk that different courts will evaluate similar factual
circumstances differently.' 8
Consistency has a value. This is law and economics. Justice Breyer
continued: "[T]he threat of antitrust mistakes . . . means that underwriters
[that is, Wall Street] must act in ways that will avoid not simply conduct that
the securities law forbids (and will likely continue to forbid), but also a wide
range of joint conduct that the securities law [actually] encourages."' 9
A majority of the Supreme Court believes that courts are likely to get
these cases wrong. 20 Therefore, they do not fit in the judicial sphere.
As my time expires, let us turn to my final case, Philip Morris v.
Williams.2' Again Justice Breyer expresses concern about the arbitrary
deprivation of property, this time focusing on punitive damages from a big
tobacco company.22 Here Justice Breyer is joined by Justice Souter, and
when you look at the configuration in the 5-4 opinion, the usual ideological
lines break down. 23 Also note that there is an enormous fault line with both
Justices Scalia and Thomas, both with respect to punitive damage awards 24
and the dormant Commerce Clause (an area of law in which Dean Kathleen
Sullivan and I have co-labored on behalf of the wine industry in
California). 5
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine provides that states should not
discriminate against interstate commerce, nor pose undue burdens on
interstate commerce.26 Justices Thomas and Scalia will simply have none of
this. 27 Why? Are they against commerce? No.28 Are they anti-business?
18. Id. at 2395.
19. Id. at 2396.
20. Id. at 2397.
21. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
22. Id. at 1062.
23. Id. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
24. See id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by
Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.).
25. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
26. See, e.g., id. at 472 ("[S]tate laws violate the commerce clause if they mandate differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter." (internal citation omitted)); Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Public Servs. Comm'n, 545
U.S. 429 (2005) (stating that the Court has invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause "state
regulations that unjustifiably discriminate on their face against out-of-state entities, or that impose
burdens on interstate trade that are clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
(internal citations omitted)).
27. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 596-609
(1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority found, over vigorous dissents by Justices Scalia and
544
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No. 29 Do they trust judicial power to make these kinds of assessments?
No.30 Do they think it is legitimate for judges to make these kinds of
assessments? No.3 ' Rather, it is for Congress to decide.
Thomas, that the town's tax exemption for local charitable organizations violated the dormant
Commerce Clause. Id. at 595.
28. See id. at 596.
29. See id. at 596-609.
30. See id.; see also Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2382, 2395 (2007).
31. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 596-609 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Credit
Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2395.

